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ABSTRACT
This paper provides new evidence that state policies play a role in the location of industry. The paper
classifies a state as pro-business or anti-business depending upon whether or not the state has a right-to-
work law. The paper finds that, on average, there is a large abrupt increase in manufacturing activity
when crossing a state border from an anti-business state into a pro-business state.
*The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1 Introduction
Do the pro-business policies pursued by some states attract industry? This is a
controversial issue. In state capitals throughout the country, proponents of pro-
business policies routinely claim that state policies are an important determinant of
business location. But this claim is open to debate. While there has been no shortage
of studies on the issue, there is a lack of consensus.1 Some studies have found pro-
business policies to be associated with growth in industry, but it is di±cult to infer
from these studies that the policies caused growth.
This paper uses a fresh approach to examine this issue. It considers what happens
to manufacturing activity when one crosses state borders. Suppose that a state with
a pro-business policy is adjacent to a state with an anti-business policy. If state
policies are important for the location of industry, we should ¯nd a discontinuous
drop in manufacturing activity when crossing the border from the pro-business state
into the anti-business state.
I classify a state as pro-business if it has a right-to-work law and as anti-business
if it does not. Section 2 explains in detail my reasons for focusing on right-to-work
laws. I will brie°y mention two of those reasons. The ¯rst is that a right-to-work
law is, in itself, a pro-business law because such a law weakens unions. A right-to-
work law makes it illegal for someone to be forced to join a union as a condition of
employment at a ¯rm. It is clear that the original intent of these laws was to weaken
unions, and there is some evidence that the laws have had their intended e®ect. The
second reason for focusing on right-to-work laws is that states with such laws tend to
adopt a variety of other pro-business policies. Thus a right-to-work law serves as an
indicator of a pro-business legislative climate.
Figure 1 is a map showing which states have right-to-work laws. The tendency
for states within the same region to have the same policy is striking. No state in
the traditional manufacturing belt (the New England, mid-Atlantic and Great Lakes
states) has a right-to-work law. Every state that joined the Confederacy has a right-
to-work law. In fact, the border between the Confederate and Union states coincides
with a portion of the right-to-work border.
1See Bartik (1991) and Wasylenko (1991) for surveys.
1There has been a dramatic shift of manufacturing activity to states with right-
to-work laws. Manufacturing employment across states without right-to-work laws
is virtually the same today as it was in 1947 and is 10 percent less than it was in
1963. What was once called the manufacturing belt is now sometimes called the \rust
belt." In contrast, since 1947 manufacturing employment has increased 150 percent
in the right-to-work states. North Carolina and Mississippi are now the leading
manufacturing states in terms of manufacturing's share of total employment.
The fact that industry shifted in a dramatic way to right-to-work states does not
necessarily imply that the pro-business policies pursued by these states caused this
migration. Many factors that have nothing to do with state policy played a role in
the migration of manufacturing to the South.2
For starters, there is little doubt that the low wages in the South played a major
role in attracting industry. One explanation for these low wages that has nothing to
do with policy is the productivity revolution in agriculture. Advances in agricultural
productivity freed up labor resources from farms and depressed wages. This had a
disproportionate e®ect in the South because of the high share of agriculture in the
southern economy. Because of the productivity revolution in agriculture, we would
expect to see an increase in manufacturing activity in states that initially had high
agricultural shares. But, not coincidently, the states with high agricultural shares all
passed right-to-work laws and the states with low agricultural shares did not. This
makes it hard to separate the agriculture-based explanation from the policy-based
explanation.
There is also the issue of unions. It is widely believed that industry left the North
to escape unions. Unions have been weak in the South and continue to be weak for
various reasons, most of which probably have little to do with policy. Southerners
as a group are perceived to have hostile attitudes towards unions. Perhaps this is
related to the fact that manufacturing was a small share of the Southern economy
during the union movement earlier this century. Even if right-to-work laws were
irrelevant in location decisions, we would still expect to see a positive correlation
between manufacturing growth and these laws. This follows because hostile attitudes
2For a discussion of these various factors see Fuchs (1963) or Wheat (1973).
2towards unions would be associated with both growth in manufacturing activity as
well as passage of these laws.
Other factors for why industry shifted south include climate and changes in trans-
portation. The advent of air conditioning made the climate in the South relatively
more attractive than the climate in the North. This played a role in attracting people,
and along with this migration of people, came a migration of manufacturing activ-
ity. Right-to-work states tend to be warmer than the other states, so the climate
factor should induce a positive correlation between manufacturing growth and right-
to-work status. Changes in transportation, such as the substitution of trucking for
rail transport, may have diminished the forces that originally caused manufacturing
to agglomerate in the manufacturing belt, and this might lead to a spreading out
of industry. Manufacturing activity might have grown more in right-to-work states
because manufacturing activity was initially low in these states.
To identify the e®ect of state policies on the location of industry, one might at-
tempt to control in a regression analysis for the various geographical factors that
determine the distribution of industrial activity. One would have to obtain infor-
mation on the climate of a location, the fertility of the soil, access to an ocean, a
river, or lake, the proximity to raw materials, and so forth. This list of variables
one would have to control for is somewhat daunting. A particularly di±cult issue is
how one might handle the possibility of agglomeration economies. Two di®erent loca-
tions might be identical in natural geographic factors. But because of agglomeration
economies, industry might concentrate in one of the locations and not the other
This paper is able to draw inferences about the e®ects of state policies by exam-
ining what happens at state borders.3 At state borders, the geographic determinants
of the distribution of industry, e.g., climate, soil fertility, access to transportation,
the level of agglomeration bene¯ts, and so one, are approximately the same on both
sides of the border. What di®ers at the border is policy. To the extent that the pro-
business policies pursued by the southern states have been a factor in the southward
3Some previous research has examined border areas as a way of determining the e®ects of di®erent
policies on the part of adjacent states. Fox (1986) ¯nds evidence that di®erences in sales tax rates
between neighboring states a®ect retail sales in border counties. Card and Krueger (1994) consider
the New Jersey/Pennsylvania border area to examine the e®ects of an increase in the minimum
wage.
3movement of industry, there should be an abrupt change in manufacturing activity at
the border. In contrast, if the policies make no di®erence, there should be no abrupt
change at the border. Consider the case of climate. While the average temperature in
the South is certainly much higher than in the North, in the border area the temper-
ature is approximately the same on both sides of the border. To the extent that the
economic development of the South is due to its favorable climate, there should be no
abrupt change at the border. Analogously, if state policies are irrelevant, then union
power will not change abruptly at state borders and neither will industrial activity.
I ¯nd evidence that manufacturing activity increases abruptly when crossing the
right-to-work border into a right-to-work state. To obtain my estimates, I use data
on manufacturing employment levels for counties and classify each county by how far
its population centroid is from the right-to-work border. I ¯nd that manufacturing
employment in a county as a percent of total employment in the county increases
on average by approximately one third when crossing the border into a right-to-work
state. It is important to emphasize that a ¯nding that employment increases one
third at a state border does not imply that a pro-business state policy increases
employment by one third throughout the state. The e®ects of policy di®erences far
from the border can be very di®erent from the e®ects close to the border. This issue
is discussed in Section 3.
In addition to examining the levels of industrial activity, I also look at growth rates
in manufacturing employment over the postwar period 1947-1992. As mentioned
earlier, growth in right-to-work states is remarkably higher than in the remaining
states. I ¯nd that there is a sharp di®erence in growth rates right at the boundary
where the policy changes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates why I focus on
right-to-work laws. Section 3 is a brief theoretical section that makes a few points
about what can happen at state borders. Section 4 explains how I handled the
geographic nature of the data. Section 5 is the main section of the paper. It examines
what happens to manufacturing activity at the border. Section 6 concludes.
42 Why Focus on Right-to-Work Laws?
The purpose of this section is to motivate why I choose to focus on right-to-work laws.
It is useful to begin with some background about right-to-work law history. Florida
and Arkansas passed the ¯rst right-to-work laws in 1944. It was not initially clear
whether these statutes were legal under federal labor law. This ambiguity was cleared
up in 1947 when the US Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act. Section 14(b) of this
act gave states the legal power to pass right-to-work laws. After the Taft-Hartley Act,
more states passed right-to-work laws, with most of the legislation enacted in the late
1940s and 1950s (see Gall (1988) for a discussion of the legislative battles). With three
exceptions, the map of the right-to-work states as it exists today (see Figure 1) was
in place by 1958. The three exceptions are as follows: Indiana, in 1965, repealed the
right-to-work law it had passed in 1957; Louisiana passed its right-to-work law in
1976; and Idaho passed its law in 1986. Even though the map has changed little for
some time, the controversy about these laws continues. The National Right to Work
Committee, an anti-union lobbying group, remains busy trying to pass these laws in
states that do not have them. And pro-union forces actively try to repeal these laws
in states that do.4 At the federal level, there is an e®ort by the anti-union forces to
pass a national right-to-work law.5 Pro-union forces have been seeking a repeal of
Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act since the act was passed.
This paper focuses on right-to-work laws for two reasons. First, a right-to-work
law is a clear-cut case of a pro-business policy. Second, right-to-work states tend to
pursue other pro-business policies, so the presence of a right-to-work law is a proxy
of a pro-business climate.
2.1 Right-to-work Laws are Pro-Business
Let's take as a given that a policy that weakens unions is a policy that is pro-business.
There are reasons to believe that right-to-work laws weaken unions. Under a right-to-
4For example, labor unions have recently tried to pass Fair Share legislation in states with right-
to-work laws. This would enable unions to negotiate clauses in their contracts that would force all
workers to contribute their \fair share" of organizing costs. See Lewis (1993).
5See the article by the sponsor of this legislation, Senator Orrin Hatch (R., Utah): \...But the
Strong-Arm Tactics Continue," Wall Street Journal, September 1, 1995.
5work law, an employee covered under a union contract cannot be forced to pay union
dues. Unions complain that this creates a free-rider problem. Covered employees
can enjoy the bene¯ts of collective bargaining without paying the cost. Freeman and
Medo® (1984, p. 243) report that \in right-to-work states, upwards of 20 percent of
workers covered by collective bargaining are not union members." This limits the
¯nancial resources of a union, and this, in turn, may weaken its bargaining power.
A right-to-work law reduces the value to a union of organizing a plant compared
to what the value would be if the union could impose a union shop. Hence, we might
expect that a right-to-work law would lower the frequency with which unions success-
fully organize plants. Ellwood and Fine (1987) provide some evidence that passage
of a right-to-work law reduces the success of subsequent organizing drives. Their
results suggest that a right-to-work law reduces the percent of employees working in
organized plants by 5 to 10 percent. This is consistent with other recent studies, e.g.,
Ichniowski and Zax (1991), that right-to-work laws have a small negative e®ect on
union membership.6
While the e®ect of right-to-work laws on union membership is a well studied
subject, there are relatively few studies of the e®ect of the laws on plant location.
Some statistical studies, including Newman (1983) and Plaut and Pluta (1983), report
that right-to-work laws are associated with various measures of state growth, such as
growth in manufacturing employment.7 These studies do not establish that right-to-
work laws caused the higher growth.
There are case studies that suggest right-to-work laws might make a di®erence
in plant location. A good example is the case of Nissan's choice of a site for its
North American automobile plant. Nissan was and remains openly anti-union. All
the states on the ¯nal list (Tennessee, Georgia, and South Carolina) were right-to-
work states. All of these states had the drawback of being far from the automotive
supplier base centered in Michigan. Nissan eventually chose a site in Tennessee,
the closest right-to-work state to Michigan. Rubenstein (1992) writes, \The choice
of rural Tennessee ¯t Nissan's strong anti-union orientation. The nearby Nashville
6There is a debate in the literature about how big this e®ect is. See Moore and Newman (1985)
for a survey.
7This contrasts with an earlier study by So®er and Korenich (1961) that found little relationship.
6metropolitan area had little automotive employment. More importantly, Tennessee
was a so-called right-to-work state." Perrucci (1994, p.56) makes a similar point.
It is certainly clear that states that have right-to-work laws use them to promote
their state. For example, Louisiana advertises that it has a right-to-work law in
the trade magazine Site Selection. As discussed in Cobb's (1993) history of the
South's e®ort to attract industry, development o±cials in southern states regarded
their states' hostile public policies toward unions as important selling points for their
states.
2.2 Right-to-work States are Pro-Business States
States that have right-to-work laws tend to adopt other pro-business policies com-
pared with states that do not have these laws. Consider, for example, the border pair
of Minnesota, a state without a right-to-work law, and North Dakota, a state with
such a law. Minnesota, the home of Hubert Humphrey and Walter Mondale, has a
strong tradition of pro-labor tendencies. The Democratic party is actually called the
Democratic-Farm-Labor party in this state. Minnesota was the ¯rst state to require
employers to o®er parental leave and the ¯rst state to ban the hiring of permanent
replacements of strikers.8 North Dakota has di®erent traditions. It can be counted on
to vote Republican in presidential contests. It has a reputation for having low taxes.
A 1983 study of border cities by the Minnesota Planning Division (1983) found that
a typical business could cut its taxes in half by moving from the Minnesota side of
the border to the North Dakota side. The same study also reported that workers
compensation costs were signi¯cantly lower on the North Dakota side.9
One can ¯nd rankings of \state business climates" in a variety of places. One
well-known ranking is the one constructed by the Fantus company in 1975.10 Though
somewhat dated, the Fantus index was constructed in a more comprehensive way
than more recent alternatives. The ranking was based on 15 di®erent aspects of state
policy, including labor-market policies, unemployment compensation taxes, corporate
8The law bannning permanent replacements was subsequently overturned by the courts.
9Minnesota has recently changed its workers compensation policy to be more in line with its
neighboring states.
10Weinstein and Firestine (1978) present the results of this ranking and discuss how it was
constructed.
7income taxes, and so forth. Table 1 presents the ranking of the states according to
the overall score. The striking thing about Table 1 is the extremely high correlation
between business climate ranking and presence of a right-to-work law. This occurs
even though right-to-work law status counts for only one of the 15 di®erent criteria
in the index, and the 15 di®erent categories were equally weighted.
Consider the states along the right-to-work border in Figure 1. In virtually every
case, the right-to-work states have higher overall business climate rankings than their
neighboring states without right-to-work laws. The only exceptions involve the west-
ern states of Colorado, Wyoming and Idaho (which will not be included in the analy-
sis, for reasons discussed later) and Missouri and Kansas. But note that in the
Missouri/Kansas exception, Kansas, the right-to-work state, is ranked only one spot
below Missouri, its neighbor without a right-to-work law. Hence, my empirical re-
sults would be essentially the same, if I used the Fantus rankings to classify states as
pro-business or anti-business instead of right-to-work status.
An interesting feature of Table 1 is that states with extremely low legislative busi-
ness climate rankings are never found bordering states with extremely high rankings;
i.e., we don't see states like New York (widely believed to be extremely anti-business)
bordering states like South Carolina (widely believed to be extremely pro-business).
There are two reasons for this. First, underlying characteristics of states may change
gradually as we move across space, and this might tend to smooth out the way poli-
cies change over space. Second, competition between neighboring states may tend to
cause adjacent states to o®er similar policies. This suggests that even if di®erences
in state policies do matter, we might not pick this up by looking at bordering states
because bordering states might tend to have similar policies. But this isn't necessarily
true; there may be \fault lines" where polices change in an important way at state
borders. The right-to-work border may be such a fault line.
3 Theoretical Background
Before looking at the data, it is useful to start with a theoretical model that lays
out what can happen at state borders when adjacent states pursue di®erent policies.
This section presents a simple model and makes several points that will play a role in
8the later discussion. For example, this section discusses what can be learned about
the e®ects of a policy far from the border from measuring the e®ects near the border.
The economy is a line segment. Locations are indexed by y 2 [¡1;1]. There
are two political jurisdictions or states, and y = 0 is the boundary. The locations
with y · 0 are in a state called the South. The locations with y > 0 are in state
called the North. The South pursues a pro-business policy, while the North pursues
an anti-business policy.
At each location, there is a set of manufacturing entrepreneurs. Assume for now
that the entrepreneurs are initially uniformly spread out through the economy. An
entrepreneur initially located at a point y chooses whether to set up a factory at
his or her initial location y or to set up no plant at all. As explained below, some
entrepreneurs may have a third option of building a plant at an alternate location. Let
q denote the productivity of a manufacturing entrepreneur. This equals the amount
of the ¯nal good that is produced if a manufacturing agent of productivity q sets up
a plant and employs a worker. Assume that q is uniformly distributed on the unit
interval and that the distribution of q is independent of location.
Workers are perfectly mobile and homogeneous. There is a competitive wage w
in the economy that is paid for each unit of labor that is constant across locations.
If a manufacturing entrepreneur sets up a factory in a location in the South, the
entrepreneur's pro¯t equals his or her productivity q less the competitive wage w paid
to the single employee less any moving costs incurred. (Moving costs are described
below). If a manufacturing entrepreneur sets up in the North, an additional cost c
is incurred. This cost arises because the North pursues the anti-business policy. The
cost c has a variety of interpretations. It could represent a wage premium that arises
because of pro-union policies in the North. In this case, the wage w+c at a Northern
factory will be above the competitive wage w; and manufacturing jobs in the North
will be rationed. An alternative interpretation of c is that it is a dead-weight loss from
wasteful work practices that are imposed by unions in the North. Another possibility
is that c is some kind of tax.
As mentioned above, some entrepreneurs have the option of moving to an alternate
location. With probability p, an entrepreneur initially located at location y > 0 in the
9North has some alternate location y0 < 0 in the South. Given that an entrepreneur has
an alternate location, assume that this location y0 is drawn from a uniform distribution
over the set of locations [¡1;0] in the South. Finally, assume that the cost of moving
from y to y0 is t ¢ (y ¡ y0), i.e., t dollars per unit distance moved.
This simple formulation captures a number of intuitive ideas. The ¯rst idea is
that the further one moves from his or her initial location, the bigger the cost. The
second idea is that an entrepreneur may not have the option of moving to the border
point y0 = 0 in the South to minimize moving costs. The initial location at y may
have some speci¯c geographic features that the entrepreneur needs, e.g., access to a
river, a critical raw material, etc. The border might not have the critical geographic
features, but an interior location y0 in the South may have these critical geographic
features.
Let M(y) denote the measure of manufacturing employment at location y. Since
each factory hires one worker, this equals the measure of entrepreneurs initially at
y who set up plants plus any entrepreneurs who move to y to set up a plant. It is
straightforward to calculate M(y), and its shape is illustrated in Figure 2a. There
exists a critical distance ^ y de¯ned by t^ y ´ c such that the moving cost of moving
this distance exactly equals the cost c of the anti-business policy. Entrepreneurs at
locations y > ^ y in the North are so far from the border that it would never be worth
moving to the South. The measure of manufacturing employment here (denote this
m±) equals the measure of entrepreneurs initially there with a productivity level q
above w + c. Consider next the analogous case where y < ¡^ y. This is so far in the
interior of the North that nobody would move there. The measure of employment
here m0 is the measure of entrepreneurs with productivity above w. Note that m0
is higher than m±, since the productivity threshold of w on the pro-business side is
lower than the productivity threshold of w + c on the anti-business side.
Now consider y 2 (0; ^ y). Manufacturing entrepreneurs in this region may be lucky
enough to obtain locations in the South that are worth moving to; i.e., ones where
t ¢ (y ¡ y0) < c. The lower is y, the closer the initial location is to the border and
the higher the probability that the entrepreneur draws a Southern location worth
moving to. This accounts for why manufacturing employment M(y) is lower the
10lower is y. Right at the border where the policy changes, there is a discontinuous
increases in manufacturing employment as we cross into the South. As we lower y
further and move further South, manufacturing employment M(y) decreases. This
follows because as we move further away from the border in the South, the pool of
entrepreneurs who are willing to pay the moving cost to get there shrinks.
Think of the status quo as a case where the policies are the same in both states.
In particular, suppose that initially both states pursue the same anti-business policy
(For example, think of this as a time period before the Taft-Hartley Act when right-
to-work laws were illegal). In this case, employment equals m± at all locations. This
is illustrated by the dotted line in Figure 2a. Now consider what happens if the South
adopts the pro-business policy. In this particular ¯gure, the e®ect of the policy is
very small at locations away from the border since m0 is not much bigger than m±.
However, the policy change has a big e®ect at the border, driven by the entrepreneurs
initially located just north of the border, who make a small move to the area just
south of the border. This example shows that ¯nding a big e®ect at the border by
no means implies that a policy has a big e®ect far from the border. The e®ect of a
policy may ¯zzle out to virtually nothing when we move away from the border.
But it is also possible for the e®ect of the policy not to ¯zzle out as we move
away from the border, as can be seen in the following two examples. Suppose ¯rst
that t = 1 so that moving costs are in¯nite. This example is illustrated in Figure
2b. Without the policy, all locations have an employment of m±. If the pro-business
policy is adopted in the South, employment in the South increases to m0 because the
productivity threshold decreases from w+c to w. Employment in the North remains
¯xed because moving costs are too high for anyone to move.
The second example is where t = 0 so that moving costs are zero. This is illus-
trated in Figure 2c. Assume also that c is close to zero. In the status quo where the
South does not adopt the policy, employment is m± everywhere. If the South adopts
the policy, employment decreases in the North and increases in the South by virtu-
ally the same amount. The policy has virtually no e®ect on aggregate manufacturing
employment since the cost of the policy is negligible. Even though the cost of the
policy is negligible, anyone who has an opportunity to move to the South does so
11because the moving cost is zero. The movers to the South spread themselves out, so
there is no change in manufacturing activity as we move away from the border.
Figures 2b and 2c illustrate that it is not possible to draw welfare conclusions
from this border analysis. The two examples look exactly alike. Manufacturing
employment is °at in the South, falls discontinuously at the border, and is °at in the
North. However, these two examples are very di®erent in terms of the welfare e®ects
of the policy. In the case of Figure 2b, the adoption of the pro-business policy by
the South creates wealth in the South and has no e®ect in the North. In the case
of Figure 2c, adoption of the policy has a negligible e®ect on aggregate employment
and welfare. The policy just redistributes manufacturing employment to the South.
Suppose one were interested in determining the e®ect of the policy at locations
far from the border. Based on the discussion so far, one might want to look at what
happens to manufacturing employment as we move away from the border. If, as in
Figure 2a, manufacturing employment in the South drops o® quickly away from the
border, one might think that the e®ects of the policy away from the border might
not be large. The ¯nal example illustrates that one should be careful about drawing
such a conclusion.
Drop the assumption that the initial manufacturing endowments are uniformly
distributed across the economy. Assume instead that the initial endowments are such
that if policies were the same in the North and the South, the North would have a
higher share of manufacturing activity. This is illustrated in Figure 2d. The dotted
line illustrates manufacturing employment in the status quo where the North and the
South pursue the same anti-business policy. In this case, manufacturing employment
continuously increases as one moves in the direction of the North.
Suppose the South adopts the pro-business policy. (One reason it might adopt
a di®erent policy from the North is that its manufacturing endowment is di®erent.)
Suppose t = 0 as in Figure 2c. The e®ect of the pro-business policy will look some-
thing like the solid line in Figure 2d. The policy has a large e®ect on manufacturing
activity at locations far from the border. However, the pattern near the border looks
the same as in Figure 2a where the e®ects far from the border are small. So, one
has to be careful not to confuse 2a and 2d. In principle, it might be possible to
12distinguish 2a and 2d by looking for the kinks ^ y and ¡^ y in ¯gure 2a. However, this
would certainly be a tricky business, and I do not try to do it here.
In the empirical analysis, I will look at what happens to manufacturing employ-
ment as a share of total employment. To tie the empirical work to the model, consider
an extension of the model to allow for the existence of service entrepreneurs that are
similar to the manufacturing entrepreneurs already described, with one di®erence.
The di®erence is that the service entrepreneurs do not pay the cost c of the anti-
business policy in the North. This assumption is easy to motivate in the context
of state policies towards unions. Unlike manufacturing, services have extremely low
unionization rates. A policy in the North that strengthens unions will be irrelevant to
a service entrepreneur to the extent the entrepreneur does not have any union to deal
with. Under the assumption that service entrepreneurs do not pay c, the di®erences
in state policies will not e®ect the distribution of service employment. Suppose we
look at manufacturing's share of total employment (i.e., manufacturing plus services)
and plot this as a function of distance from the border. Manufacturing's share as a
function of distance from the border will be similar in shape to the plots in Figure 2.
On the basis of the discussion of this section, we can draw several conclusions.
First, if the policy makes a di®erence for manufacturing activity (i.e., if c > 0) but
not service activity, then there will be a discontinuous jump in manufacturing's share
of total employment when we cross the border into the pro-business state. Second,
it is di±cult to determine the e®ect of the policy far away from the border based on
what we see close to the border. What we can say is that an estimate of the e®ect
at the border places an upper bound on the e®ect far from the border. Third, it is
di±cult to draw welfare conclusions. Even if there is a large change in manufacturing
activity at the border, the welfare e®ects of the policy might be small.
4 The Treatment of the Geographic Data
This section describes the treatment of the geographic data. I start with a few
de¯nitions. States that currently have right-to-work laws (see Figure 1) are pro-
business states and those that do not are anti-business states. The policy-change
border is the set of state borders that separate pro-business states from anti-business
13states.
The county is the geographic unit for this analysis. The county o®ers the ¯nest
level of detail for which comprehensive Census Bureau data are available. Figure 3
depicts the boundary lines of the approximately 3000 counties of the 48 contiguous
states.
I obtained the longitude and latitude coordinates of the population centroid of
each county. Using these geographic coordinates, I calculated the minimum distance
from the population centroid of the county to the policy-change border and called this
variable mindisti. Figure 3 illustrates all the counties that are within 25 miles from
the border, i.e., the counties for which mindisti · 25. The counties within 25 miles
of the border on the pro-business side are dark gray and the corresponding counties
on the anti-business side are light gray.
In Figure 3, a dotted line separates the western states (Montana, Wyoming, Col-
orado, New Mexico, and the states further west) from the rest of the country. If we
look east of this dotted line, the set of counties 25 miles from the border nicely trace
out the policy-change border. These counties form a strip of land on both sides of the
border of fairly uniform width. In contrast, the set of counties in the West that are
25 miles from the border makes up what looks to be an odd assortment of counties.
The reason for this di®erence is that counties in the West are so much bigger than
counties outside of the West. Many counties in the West are larger than the state of
New Jersey.
I chose to eliminate the western states from the main analysis of this paper. My
main reason for doing so is the large size of the counties in these states. A key step in
my method is to accurately measure the distance of observed manufacturing activity
from the policy-change border. The coarseness of the geographic information in the
western states makes accurate measurements of distance relatively di±cult to do. A
second consideration is that Idaho|a border state in the West|only recently passed
its right-to-work law. In contrast, outside of the West, all states along the policy-
change border (this excludes Louisiana and Indiana) have had the same right-to-work
policy since 1958. In this analysis, I am looking for long-run e®ects of policy, and
my prior belief is that this is a process that can take decades. A third consideration
14is that many of the counties in the western states are sparsely populated. There is
likely to be a lot of noise in data from sparsely populated counties.
While the western states are excluded in the main analysis, I have redone the
analysis with the western states included, and the estimates do not change much.
This is discussed at the end of Section 5.
So, now exclude the states west of the dotted line. In the remaining states, the
policy-change border has two segments. Segment 1 begins at point A, at the western
end of the Oklahoma-Texas border, and ends at point B, where the Maryland-Virginia
border meets the Atlantic Ocean. I obtained the geographic coordinates of the line
segments that make up this border. I mapped out the border and determined mile
markers along the border analogous to something one might ¯nd on a highway. For
example, at point A the mile marker is zero. At the point where the Oklahoma-Texas
border ends and the Oklahoma-Arkansas border begins is the 716 mile marker (the
Oklahoma-Texas border is 716 miles long). Analogously, at the 914 mile marker, the
Oklahoma-Arkansas border ends and the Missouri-Arkansas border begins. Segment
1 ends at the Atlantic Ocean with the 2386 mile marker.
Segment 2 of the policy-change border begins at point C, where the Minnesota-
North Dakota border intersects the boundary with Canada. It ends at point D, at
the western end of the Oklahoma-Kansas border. Segment 2 is 1891 miles long.
As discussed earlier, I determined the minimum distance mindisti of county i to
the policy change border. I also kept track of the mile marker along the policy-change
border at which the minimum distance was attained. The geography of the actual
policy-change border is somewhat complicated because the border curves and bends.
I found it useful to map the geographic information into a space where the border is
a straight line. In essence, I tugged on the endpoints of the border and straightened
the border out. I de¯ned two variables, yi and xi, for each county i. I set the absolute
value of yi equal to the distance between the center of the county and the border. I
let yi be positive if the county is in an anti-business state, and negative otherwise.
Formally, if county i is in an anti-business state, then yi = mindisti; and if county i
is in a pro-business state, then yi = ¡mindisti. The variable xi is de¯ned to be the
point along the policy-change border at which the minimum distance to the border is
15obtained. The point xi speci¯es both the segment number and the mile marker of the
closest point along the border. This procedure maps the complicated geographic data
of the counties into a Cartesian space where the policy-change border is de¯ned by
the straight line y = 0. The counties with positive y are in the anti-business region.
The counties with negative y are in the pro-business region. The variable x provides
a lateral dimension. A change in x at y = 0 is a movement along the policy-change
border.
5 The E®ect on Manufacturing Activity
I now address the main question of this paper. Is there an abrupt change in manu-
facturing activity at the border where policy changes?
Two measures of manufacturing activity will be considered. The ¯rst measure is
manufacturing employment in a county as a percent of total private nonagricultural
employment in the county. The use of this measure was discussed at the end of Section
3. I will focus on the data from 1992, the most recent available when I began this
project, but I also consider other years. I use County Business Patterns (CBP) data
as well as data from the Census of Manufactures (see the appendix for a discussion
of the data). In the 1992 CBP, employment of all US manufacturing establishments
was 18.2 million, and this represented 19.6 percent of total private employment that
year.
The second measure is the growth rate in manufacturing employment over the
period 1947 to 1992. The growth rate in county i is de¯ned as




where empi;47 and empi;92 are the levels of manufacturing employment. This measure
of growth has a maximum value of 200 that is attained if a county had no employment
in 1947 and positive employment in 1992. Analogously, the minimum value is -200.
I choose this measure of growth because otherwise some counties would have in¯nite
growth rates. Over the 1947 to 1992 time period, total US manufacturing employment
grew at a rate of 24 percent as de¯ned in (1). I picked 1947 as the starting year because
this is the year of the Taft-Hartley Act which enabled states to pass right-to-work
16laws.
Before beginning any sort of statistical analysis, it is useful to look at a picture.
Figure 4 illustrates the geographic distribution of the county manufacturing-share
deciles. The number to the right of the boxes in the legend is the top share in
the decile. For example, the ¯rst decile of counties consists of the counties with
manufacturing shares between 0 and 4.0. The counties in the ¯rst decile are indicated
in white. The tenth decile consists of counties with shares between 48.0 and 88.8.
These are indicated in black. The intermediate deciles are indicated by intermediate
shades of gray. The two segments of the policy-change border are noted in black with
the exception of the part of the border that involves Arkansas and Tennessee where
I use white to denote state borders.
A striking thing about Figure 4 is the extent to which the top decile counties|
those with manufacturing share above 48.0 percent marked in black|are concentrated
in the South. Large sections of states like Tennessee and Mississippi are marked in
black. Consider Segment 1 of the policy-change border|the border that coincides
with the border of the Confederacy. Begin with the Arkansas-Oklahoma portion of
this border and head east along the northern border of Arkansas, Tennessee, and
Virginia. It is clear in the ¯gure that the counties on the pro-business side of this
portion of the border tend to have higher manufacturing shares than the counties
on the anti-business side. But is the increase in manufacturing activity gradual as
we move from one region to the other, or is there an abrupt change at the border?
It is hard to say. On one hand, to a striking extent, the shares begin to get high
approximately at the border. The dark shades of gray in Arkansas plainly trace out
the borders of Arkansas with Oklahoma and Missouri (even the heel of the boot in
the southeastern corner of Missouri is visible). On the other hand, at some places,
the high manufacturing shares spill over into the anti-business side of the border, as
it does in parts of the Kentucky-Tennessee border. Of course, some noise is to be
expected. The advantage of the statistical analysis to follow is that some of this noise
can be averaged out.
As just mentioned, the preponderance of dark gray and black counties on the
Arkansas side make the Arkansas/Oklahoma border plainly visible. But just as clear
17is the border between Arkansas and Louisiana. In this analysis the border between
Arkansas and Louisiana is not being considered because both states have right-to-
work laws so both are classi¯ed as pro-business. However, putting Louisiana in the
pro-business category is actually counter to conventional wisdom. Louisiana has long
held a reputation of being an anti-business state.11 Compared to other southern
states it did very poorly in the Fantus rankings in Table 1. Even though Louisiana
has a right-to-work law, it was a reluctant to pass the law, waiting until 1976 to
do so.12 Compare this with Arkansas, a state with a strong reputation for being
pro-business, a state so eager to pass a right-to-work law that it did so in 1944
before any other state and three years before the Taft-Hartley act made such a law
legal. The abrupt change in manufacturing activity that is clearly evident at the
Louisiana/Arkansas border may be due to di®erences in policies between these two
states that have nothing to do with right-to-work laws.13 This is a good reminder
that any di®erences in manufacturing activity found at the right-to-work border may
be due to other policies besides right-to-work laws.
Now consider Segment 2 of the policy-change border, the segment separating the
Plains states from the industrial states of the Midwest. It's hard to pick up anything
here at the border with the naked eye (with the exception perhaps of the relatively
high frequency of ¯rst decile counties in the Minnesota border area with the Dakotas).
However, the statistical analysis to follow will indicate that, on average, border coun-
ties on the pro-business side have higher manufacturing shares than border counties
on the anti-business side.
One last comment about Figure 4 is in regards to the white (i.e., ¯rst decile)
region in Kentucky and West Virginia near the border with Virginia. The story here
11Cobb (1993, p. 157) writes that as of the 1950s, \A reputation for high taxes, free spending,
and a shady and ine®ective government that was openly hostile to business had dogged the state
since the tumultuous era of ... Huey Long." He then goes on to say that at the end of the 1970s,
\Leaders in Louisiana were still struggling to overcome their state's anticorporate image."
12It also passed a right-to-work law in 1954 that was repealed two years later.
13Another intriguing border pair is Nevada and Utah. There is virtually no manufacturing activity
in the western part of Nevada, making the outline of the state strikingly evident in the ¯gure. Since
Nevada is mostly a desert, the absence of manufacturing activity here may not come as much of
a surprise. However, the eastern part of Utah is also a desert, yet manfacturing activity becomes
relatively intense right at the Utah border. What makes this intriguing is that even though Nevada
has a right-to-work law, it did very poorly in the Fantus ranking, with a rank of 32, well below all
the other right-to-work states. In contrast, Utah did very well in the rankings, coming in at 10.
18is coal mining. There is a discontinuity in nature, e.g., mountains and coal veins, that
coincides with state boundaries. Even if state policies made no di®erence, we would
expect manufacturing shares to decline when we cross the border into Kentucky and
West Virginia since the mining share goes up. Therefore, in the statistical analysis to
follow, I will for the most part exclude the Kentucky/Virginia border and the West
Virginia/Virginia border.
The statistical analysis is divided into two parts. The ¯rst part looks at some
simple cross-tabulations of the data. The second part estimates a simple statistical
model.
5.1 Cross-tabulations of the Data
I begin by de¯ning groups of counties based on how far the counties are from the
border and the side of the border they are on. Let the anti-business border layer
be the set of counties with yi 2 (0;25]. In words, these are the counties in anti-
business states (since y > 0) that are within 25 miles of the policy-change border
(since yi · 25). These are illustrated in Figure 3 in light gray. There are 151 counties
in this set. Note this count does not include counties in the western states. As
discussed earlier, the western states are excluded in the analysis. The pro-business
border layer is the set of counties with yi 2 [¡25;0): There are 174 counties in this
layer. I also de¯ne interior layers three deep on each side of the border. For example,
for the anti-business counties, the ¯rst interior layer consists of those counties whose
center is 25 to 50 miles from the border, i.e., yi 2 (25;50]; the second interior layer
consists of those with yi 2 (50;75]; and the third interior layer consists of those with
yi 2 (75;100]. Analogously, there are three interior layers on the pro-business side.
The number of counties in each of the six interior layers ranges from a low of 116
counties for the third anti-business interior layer to a high of 149 counties for the ¯rst
pro-business interior layer.
For each county, I determined the manufacturing share of total employment in
the county and the 1947 to 1992 manufacturing employment growth rate. I then
calculated simple unweighted means across counties. The ¯rst column of Table 2
reports the mean cross-county share for the various border layers. The second column
19reports mean cross-county growth. Columns three and four report the means when
the coal region discussed earlier is excluded (i.e., the Kentucky/Virginia border and
the West Virginia/Virginia border).
I begin the discussion by focusing on the border layers. The dotted line in the
table represents the border. Just above the dotted line are the means for the anti-
business border layer, and just below it are the means for the pro-business border
layer. The table shows that there are substantial di®erences in mean share between
the two border layers. With the coal region included, mean share is 21.0 percent on
the anti-business side and 28.6 percent on the pro-business side. With the coal region
excluded, the shares are 22.1 on the anti-business side and 27.9 on the pro-business
side. In the remaining tables of this section, I exclude the coal region. As one might
expect, all the estimates of di®erences at the border are bigger if I leave the coal
region in.
Table 2 indicates that there is also a di®erence in growth rates at the border.
With the coal region included, mean growth in the anti-business border is 62.4. Just
on the other side of the border the mean growth is 100.7. These di®erences remain,
even when the coal region is excluded.
To help assess the meaning of the di®erences in manufacturing share and growth
between the border layers, it is useful to consider how these variables change as we
move across the interior of the pro-business side and the interior of the anti-business
side. Suppose we were to start at the pro-business layer 75 to 100 miles from the
border (call this Pro:75-100). Consider a move into the adjacent layer 50 to 75 miles
from the border (Pro:50-75). The manufacturing share goes from 23.1 at Pro:75-100
to 24.5 at Pro50:75, a change in share of 1.4 (I am using the data that excludes the
coal region here). The change in share of 1.4 from this movement is given in the
bottom row of Table 3. Analogously, if we move from Pro:50-75 to Pro:25-50, the
share increases from 24.5 to 25.5, an increase of 1.0. The next step to the border layer
Pro:0-25 increases the share by 2.4. So far, we have moved within the pro-business
side. In the next step, we cross the border into Anti:0-25 and the share drops by
5.8. Once on the anti-business side, the share starts going back up again as we cross
adjacent layers with the changes equalling 2.6, .3, and 0.
20There is an interesting pattern here: the share goes up gradually as we move in
the direction of the anti-business layer except for the big drop at the border. This
pattern looks like what happens in Figure 2a in the theoretical model and also like
Figure 2d. While this is intriguing, I want to put o® for the moment what to make
of this particular pattern. At this point, I am interested in establishing that the
di®erence at the border is big in absolute value compared to the di®erences found in
the interior. That is, the change in the share at the border is abrupt compared to
changes in the share that we ¯nd as we move across space in the interior. One way to
make this point is to simply observe that the di®erence in share at the border of 5.9
is more than twice as large in absolute value than the di®erences of any of the other
adjacent pairs (the next highest is 2.6). Another way to make the point is to use
simple statistical methods. Consider a series of pairwise t-tests of null hypotheses
that particular adjacent layers are drawn from the same distribution. The second
column of numbers in Table 3 gives the p-values for tests of these null hypotheses.
For example, for the Pro 75-100 and Pro:50-75 adjacent layers the p-value is .517; i.e.,
under the null hypothesis of equality, with probability .517 the di®erence in means
would be bigger in absolute value than the observed di®erence. The null hypothesis
of equality can not be rejected in this case. In contrast, the p-value for the adjacent
border layers is .003 which is highly signi¯cant. What happens at the border sticks
out as being very di®erent from what happens between the other adjacent layers.
Similar results are obtained for the growth rate. The average growth rate is 104.2
percent for the pro-business border layer and 77.2 percent for the anti-business border
layer. This di®erence is bigger in absolute value than the di®erences of the all the
other adjacent layers. This di®erence is statistically signi¯cant (with a p-value of
.008), and none of the other di®erences in growth rates between adjacent layers is
statistically signi¯cant.
The results so far suggest that, on average, there is an abrupt increase in manufac-
turing shares and growth rates when we cross the border into pro-business states. A
natural question to ask is whether this di®erence is occurring throughout the policy-
change border, or is it just happening for a few particular states?
Table 4 is a ¯rst step at addressing this issue. It is the same as Table 2, except
21it provides a breakdown by the two segments of the policy change border. That is,
it distinguishes between counties that are closest to Segment 1 (the border segment
that coincides with the border between the Confederacy and the Union) and counties
that are closest to Segment 2 (the border segment separating the Plains states from
the Midwest industrial states).
Consider ¯rst what happens to manufacturing share. Table 4 shows that the big
change in manufacturing share that we found with the combined data occurs in each
of the separate segments. For both segments, manufacturing shares increase by about
5.5 when we cross the border to the pro-business side.
Notice that for the manufacturing shares of Segment 2, with the exception of the
big drop at the border, there is a strong upward trend as we move up the column.
This upward trend is not surprising. As we move up the column, we are moving
away from states like North and South Dakota to industrial states like Minnesota,
Wisconsin, and Illinois. If state policies had no e®ect on business location, we would
expect, a priori, to ¯nd manufacturing shares gradually increasing as we move away
from the Great Plains towards the industrial heartland. If state policies did have an
e®ect on location, we might expect the share to gradually trend upward, then fall at
the border, then gradually trend upward again, as in Figure 2d from the theoretical
model. So, the model in Figure 2d is one explanation for what is happening along
Segment 2.
As discussed in the theoretical section, there is another reason the share might
trend up after we cross the border into the anti-business side. This reason is that the
e®ects of the policy may ¯zzle out as we move away from the border. This is what
happens in the model illustrated in Figure 2a. So, corresponding to Figures 2a and
2d, we have two explanations for the trend found at Segment 2: ¯rst, that the e®ects
of the policy ¯zzle out, and second, that the underlying geographic suitability for
manufacturing gradually increases. The merits of these two alternative explanations
are hard to sort out, and I am not going to do so in this paper except for making
the following observation. The policy-¯zzling-out model alone cannot account for the
pattern in Segment 2. In the policy-¯zzling-out model illustrated in Figure 2a, the
manufacturing share far into the interior of the pro-business side is at least as high as
22the share far into the interior of the anti-business side. But in the data for segment 2,
the shares in the interior of the pro-business side of 19.7 and 17.1 are much lower than
the shares of 24.4 and 26.7 in the interior of the anti-business side. This suggests that
some underlying trend in non-policy geographic factors plays some role in accounting
for why the manufacturing share trends upward in Segment 2 as we move towards
the anti-business states.
Now consider what happens with the growth rates for the two segments. In
Segment 1, the average growth rate of the border layer is 104.5, and this is the highest
growth rate over all the di®erent layers. However, this is only negligible higher than
the average growth rate of the anti-business layer. Hence, there is little di®erence at
the border for Segment 1. The story is very di®erent for Segment 2. There is a marked
di®erence in average growth between the border layers, 54.7 on the anti-business side
and 104.0 on the pro-business side. But in addition, the average growth rates of all
the layers on the anti-business side are all quite small, while the growth rates of all
the layers on the pro-business side are quite big. Something fundamental seems to
be changing at the border here.
Table 5 takes a further step at examining the extent to which the e®ects found on
the border as a whole are true for individual portions of the border. In this table, the
policy change border is broken down into pairings of individual pro-business states
with individual anti-business states. For example, Texas and Oklahoma are the ¯rst
pairing, Arkansas and Oklahoma are the second pairing, and so forth. There are 17
di®erent pairings of individual states.14 For each pair of bordering states, I calculated
the mean share and growth for the counties in the border layers (the counties 25 miles
from the border). Recall that over the entire border, the average share on the pro-
business side is 28.6 and the average share on the anti-business side is 21.0. The
¯rst two columns of Table 5 indicate that the share on the pro-business side is bigger
than on the anti-business side for virtually all the states along the border. There are
only two exceptions out of the 17 di®erent pairwise comparisons (these are highlighted
with a box around the numbers). But in these two exceptions, the di®erence in shares
between the two bordering states is essentially zero. This table indicates that to a
14For the purposes of this table, the District of Columbia is combined with Maryland.
23striking degree, the increase in manufacturing share on the pro-business side can be
found throughout the policy-change border.
The last two columns look at average growth rates for each of the border-state
pairs. The results here are not quite as impressive as the case for shares. Still, the
growth rate is lower on the pro-business side in only ¯ve out of the 17 cases. The table
indicates that increase in growth on the pro-business side is widespread throughout
the policy-change border.
5.2 A Simple Statistical Model
Table 5 shows that there are big changes in manufacturing shares as we move along
the policy-change border, in addition to the changes that occur as we move across
the policy-change border. For example, along the Texas/Oklahoma portion of the
border, the shares are relatively low on both sides: 17.3 and 16.1. On the other hand,
along the Tennessee/Kentucky portion of the border, employment on both sides is
relatively high: 48.4 and 38.7. This is also clearly evident in Figure 3. This suggests
that it might be useful to consider a statistical model that allows for the expected
employment share in a county to vary along the border as well as across the border.
This subsection considers such a model.
Suppose that the observed manufacturing share in county i in 1992 is represented
by
sharei = µi + ®(xi) + ¯(xi)yi + ²i: (2)
The variable µi is a shift term that varies with state policy, µi = 0 if the county is in an
anti-business state and µi = µ if the county is in a pro-business state. The functions
®(¢) and ¯(¢) are general continuous functions of x that allow manufacturing shares
to vary across space in a general way. The variable ²i is classical measurement error.
To understand speci¯cation (2), consider the null hypothesis that state policies
do not matter; i.e., µ = 0. Under speci¯cation (2), the expected share at a location
along the border (i.e., one with y = 0) with mile marker x is given by the general
function ®(x). The expected share at a location away from the border (i.e., one where
y 6= 0) is obtained by adding in the trend term ¯(x)y to ®(x). Note the dichotomy
24here. If at y = 0 we move in the x direction, the expected share varies in a general
nonlinear way though ®(x). If we move in the y direction, the share varies in a linear
way with slope ¯(x). My motivation for this dichotomy is that movements in the y
direction will be relatively small in the analysis, at most 100 miles either way. Hence,
a ¯rst-order (i.e., linear) approximation may be reasonable here. On the other hand,
the movements in the x direction will cover a distance of 4000 miles, so a ¯rst-order
approximation would not be reasonable.
According to speci¯cation (2), manufacturing share varies in a continuous and
fairly general way across space with a discontinuous change of µ when crossing the
border into the pro-business side. My goal here is to estimate µ. To do so, I approx-
imate function ®(¢) with a fourth-degree polynomial along border Segment 1 and a
second, di®erent, fourth-degree polynomial along border Segment 2. I do not report
my estimates of the parameters of the ®(¢) function because these parameters are
of little interest in themselves. I consider four di®erent speci¯cations for the trend
function ¯(¢). The ¯rst speci¯cation is no trend; i.e., ¯(x) = 0, for all x. The second
speci¯cation is a constant for the entire border; i.e., ¯(x) = ¯0 all x. The third spec-
i¯cation is a constant trend ¯(x) = ¯1 for xalong Segment 1 and a di®erent constant
trend ¯(x) = ¯2 for x along Segment 2. The fourth speci¯cation is to allow ¯(x)to
be a di®erent fourth-degree polynomial for each segment analogous to what I do for
®(x).
Table 6a presents the OLS estimates of µ for each of these four speci¯cations. I
restrict attention to counties within 100 miles of the border (y 2 [¡100;100]). In
speci¯cation 1 with no trend, the estimate of µis 3.4 with a standard error of .9. In
speci¯cation 2 which allows for a constant trend, the estimate of µ rises to 6.4 with
a standard error of 1.6, and the estimate for this constant trend ¯0 is .03. Given
the existence of a positive trend, it is easy to see why the estimate of µ is higher
in speci¯cation 2 than in speci¯cation 1. If there is a positive trend but we don't
allow for it, then our estimate of µ will be biased downward because locations on the
pro-business side have low (negative) y's. Speci¯cation 3 allows a di®erent constant
trend for the two di®erent segments of the border. There is a large positive trend for
Segment 2 (¯2 = :08), the Plains-States border. This is consistent with the earlier
25discussion of what happened in the cross-tabulation for this border in Table 4. Note
that the estimated trend for Segment 1, the Confederate border, is essentially zero.
Speci¯cation 4 allows for the trend to vary in a general way, but the estimate of µof
6.6 is essentially the same as in cases 2 and 3 where a trend term is introduced. The
conclusion of this statistical model then is that when crossing the border into the
pro-business side, the average increase in manufacturing share is 6.6, an increase of
one third, since the average share is approximately 20 percent. This is similar to the
di®erence found in the cross-tabulation of Table 2. The di®erence at the border has
a t-statistic of over 4 which has a high degree of statistical signi¯cance.
I considered a statistical model of county growth rates of the same form as (2), and
the estimates of µ for the growth rates are in Table 6b. The estimates of µ are similar
across the 4 speci¯cations. The estimate of µfor speci¯cation 4, the most general
case, is 23.1; i.e., the expected manufacturing employment growth rate increases by
23.1 when crossing into the pro-business side.
To place some perspective on these estimates of the shift-parameter µ, I conducted
a simple experiment. I considered a set of counties all drawn from the same side of
the policy-change border. Within this set of counties, I made up a simulated border
and estimated the statistical model (2). In order to be able to look at a variety of
di®erent simulated borders, I estimated the model for counties 50 miles above and
below the border. Table 7 reports the results of this exercise.
The middle row reports the case where the simulated border is y = 0. This is the
case where the simulated border coincides with the actual border. The estimate of µ
for manufacturing shares is 9.1, and for growth is 39.9 (I estimate the model under
speci¯cation 4 where ¯(x)is a general function). These estimates are di®erent from
the estimates of µ in Table 6 because here only counties within 50 miles of the border
are included, while in Table 6, counties up to 100 miles from the border are included.
Nevertheless, the qualitative story is the same. At the actual border, there is a big
change in manufacturing shares and growth that is highly statistically signi¯cant.
Now consider the row labeled y = 50. For this row, counties with y between 0 and
100 were considered. All of these counties are actually on the anti-business side. But
I estimated the statistical model using y = 50 as a simulated border, i.e., y between 0
26and 50 were treated as though they were pro-business, and y between 50 and 100 were
treated as anti-business. The estimate for µ is 1.1 for the case of shares and 6.1 for the
case of growth. Both of these ¯gures are small and not statistically signi¯cant. The
same can be said for the estimates of µ for the other simulated borders|the estimates
are much smaller than what is obtained at the true border, and the estimates are not
statistically signi¯cant. Table 7 indicates that there is something special about the
policy-change border.
I conclude this section by discussing what happens when data from other years
are considered and when the western states that so far have been excluded are in-
corporated into the analysis. Table 8 presents estimates for the shift-parameter µ for
these alternative cases. For all these cases, the ¯(¢) function is allowed to take the
general form corresponding to speci¯cation 4 above. As in Table 6, counties within
100 miles of the border are included. The ¯rst row of Table 8 is the baseline case
from Table 6 for the e®ect on 1992 manufacturing share. The estimate indicates that
average 1992 manufacturing share increases by 6.6 when one crosses the border to
the pro-business side.
Data on manufacturing employment at the county level is available from the Cen-
sus of Manufacturers for a variety of di®erent years. However, I ran into problems
collecting county-level data on total employment prior to 1964.15 So, for this discus-
sion, I look at manufacturing employment as a percent of county population rather
than total employment. Table 8 reports that average 1992 manufacturing employ-
ment as a percent of population increases by 2.5 when crossing the border into the
pro-business side. When we take into account that the 1992 US population was 2.7
times County-Business-Pattern total employment and that 2:5 £ 2:7 = 6:75, this es-
timate of 2.5 percent of total population is consistent with the previous estimate of
6.6 percent of total employment.
Table 8 reports the estimate of µ for various other Census years before 1992.
The estimate for 1947 is .4. Given the standard error of .4, this is not signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero in a statistical sense. Therefore, as of the date of the Taft-Hartley
15The County Business Patterns Program dates from 1947. However, before 1964, many counties
were aggregated into larger reporting units. Data on the labor force by county is available from the
Census of Population. However, this reports employment by place of residence rather than place of
employment.
27Act there was not much of a di®erence at the border. The estimate for 1963 is 1.3,
and this is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero in a statistical sense. The estimate for
1987 is 2.0. It is interesting that the di®erence has grown from 2.0 to 2.5 over the
1987 to 1992 time period. This suggests there might be more at work here than the
e®ects of right-to-work laws passed in the 1950s.
The bottom section of Table 8 shows the results when all of the Western states
are included in the analysis. Recall that I earlier excluded these states because the
counties are so large and because Idaho changed its policy status in 1985. Table 8
shows that including these states makes little di®erence. The estimate of 5.7 on the
e®ect on manufacturing share is just a little below the estimate of 6.6 obtained when
the Western states are excluded.
6 Conclusion
This paper starts out with a simple classi¯cation scheme: a state is de¯ned at pro-
business if it has a right-to-work law. It then examines the border areas between
pro-business and anti-business states. The di®erences at the border are surprisingly
big. On average, the manufacturing share of total employment in a county increases
by about a third when one crosses the border to the pro-business side. Along part of
the border, the di®erences appear to be visible on a map (Figure 3). There is a lot of
uncertainty and debate about whether or not state policies make much di®erence in
the geographic distribution of industrial activity. This results of this paper suggest
that state policies do matter.
There are, of course, limitations in the procedure used here. Di®erences at state
borders are not necessarily due to di®erences in state policies. Nature can have
discontinuities. A good example are the coal veins and mountains that begin at
the Kentucky/Virginia border. I excluded this coal region from the analysis, but
there may be others I don't know about. And even if di®erences at the border
are due to state policies, it may be policies from long ago that have nothing to do
with a state's current policies towards business. For example, because Oklahoma
was originally set up as an Indian territory more than 100 years ago, there remains
today a sharp increase in the Native American population at the border between
28Arkansas and Oklahoma. Shifts in demographics at state borders can potentially
be associated with shifts in the distribution of economic activities at state borders.
These examples suggest the need for caution in ascribing the di®erences found at the
border to di®erences in state policies towards business. We can take some comfort in
the fact that the border considered consists of 17 di®erent pairs of adjacent states and
is 4000 miles long. Over a long border, there is some hope that extraneous factors
will average out.
If the di®erences found at the border are due to di®erences in state policies, there
still is the question of which policies matter. Does a right-to-work law in itself matter?
Or is a right-to-work a proxy for a whole con¯guration of pro-business state polices
that matter? This paper does not tackle this important question. However, there are
results along the way that suggest that right-to-work laws per se are not the whole
story. For example, the border between Arkansas and Louisiana is not part of the
policy-change border because both states currently have right-to-work laws. Yet in
Figure 4, the di®erence in manufacturing activity at this border is as clear as the
di®erences at any border. What makes this case interesting is that Louisiana is the
only southern state with a reputation for being hostile to business. If di®erences in
policies unrelated to right-to-work laws account for the di®erences in manufacturing
activity at the Arkansas/Louisiana border, the same may be true for di®erences in
manufacturing activity along the right-to-work border.
29Data Appendix
Counties
Virginia is di®erent from other states in that it has 41 independent cities organized
as separate counties. Most of these independent cities are completely surrounded by
other counties. In the County Business Patterns data, employment ¯gures are given
for each of these cities.
To be consistent with other states, I combine independent cities in Virginia with
their surrounding counties. I do this in the same way that the Bureau of Economic
Analysis combines Virginia counties in the Regional Economic Information System
(REIS) program. I refer to counties grouped this way as REIS counties. These are
distinct from census counties, which are not combined.
The main analysis (which excludes the western states) considers data on 1156
census counties. These are the counties within 100 miles of the policy-change border.
After consolidating the independent cities of Virginia into their surrounding counties,
there are 1126 REIS counties in the analysis. After excluding counties in the coal-
region, there are 951 counties.
1992 Data
Employment data for 1992 is from the 1992 County Business Patterns (CBP). For
88 of the 1156 census counties, manufacturing employment was withheld for disclosure
reasons. Data on total employment was withheld for none of the 1156 counties.
Fortunately, there is a simple way to come up with a fairly good estimate of em-
ployment for the counties with withheld data (I use a similar procedure in Holmes
(1995)). In the CBP, there are cell counts for each county for the number of manu-
facturing establishments in each of the following employment size classes: 1{4, 5{9,
10{19, 20{49, 50{99, 100{249, 500{999, 1000{1499, 1500{2499, 2500{4999, and 5000
and above. To obtain my estimate of the number of manufacturing employees in each
county, for each size class I multiply the number of establishments in the size class
times the average employment in the size class. I sum this product over all the size
classes and call this estimate d empi for county i.
In addition to the above information, CBP also provides for each county the range
of total manufacturing employment in the county, e.g., 0{19, 20{99, and so forth. I
30verify that my estimate d empi falls within these bounds. In the ¯ve cases where it does
not, I adjust the estimate so that it falls within the bounds. All of the 88 counties
with estimated manufacturing employment data have less than 5000 employees. More
than half have less than 100 employees.
Population data is from the Census Bureau.
1947 Data
While the County Business Patterns data were collected in 1947, data are missing
for many counties, so the data are not usable for this project. Limits in computation
technology at the time led the Census Bureau to restrict the number of geographical
units for each state to 99. For states such as Texas, with over 300 counties, counties
were combined into 99 groups.
The 1947 Census of Manufactures did publish county-level data on manufacturing
employment, and data is missing for only a few counties. Employment data for a
county was withheld only if there were 1 or 2 establishments in the county. Data are
missing for 67 counties. Data on cell counts of establishment sizes are not available
at the ¯ne level of detail of the 1992 CBP (there are only 3 categories, 1{19, 20{99,
and 100 and over). Hence, I do not try to estimate 1947 employment for the missing
observations.
Data for Other Years
As discussed above, in the 1947 census, employment data were withheld only if
there were one or two establishments in the county (a relatively rare occurrence).
This disclosure policy was maintained through the 1963 census. Hence, the data for
the 1954, 1958, and 1963 censuses reported in Table 4 are analogous to the data for
1947.
Beginning in 1967, the Census Bureau greatly tightened its disclosure rules. There
are a relatively large number of counties with missing employment observations. How-
ever, for these later years there exist data on cell counts of establishment sizes at a
relatively ¯ne level of detail. For the 1982 and 1987 Census of Manufactures, I esti-
mated manufacturing employment at locations with withheld data, using a procedure
similar to the one used for the 1992 CBP data. I was unable to do this for the 1972,
so there are many missing observations for this year as is apparent in Figure 8.
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34Table 1
1975 Fantus Legislative Business Climate Rankings
Source for Fantus rankings: Weinstein and Firestine (1978)
1975 Fantus
Ranking




4 South Dakota yes
5 South Carolina yes
6 North Carolina yes
7 Florida yes
8 Arkansas yes
9 Indiana no  (Had a law, but repealed in 1965.)
10 Utah yes












23 New Mexico no
23 Wyoming yes
25 Idaho yes (Passed law in 1985.)
26 Louisiana yes (Passed law in 1976.)
27 Ohio no
28 New Hampshire no



















48 New York noTable 2
Manufacturing Employment Shares and Growth Rates
Cross-County Averages














75-100 25.9 67.5 25.0 68.2
Anti- 50-75 23.1 62.7 25.0 80.9
Business 25-50 23.2 82.0 24.7 88.8
0-25 21.0 62.4 22.1 77.2
0-25 28.6 100.7 27.9 104.2
Pro- 25-50 26.7 89.1 25.5 88.3
Business 50-75 26.7 92.9 24.5 90.1
75-100 25.4 91.8 23.1 93.5Table 3
T-tests of Equality of  Means of Adjacent Layers
Coal Region Excluded
Share Growth Rate










Anti:50-75 ® Anti:75-100 .0 .975 12.7 .259
Anti:25-50 ® Anti:50-75 .3 .880 -7.9 .463
Anti:0-25 ® Anti:25-50 2.6 .185 11.6 .283
Pro:0-25 ® Anti:0-25 -5.8 .003 -27.0 .008
Pro:25-50 ® Pro:0-25 2.4 .217 15.9 .104
Pro:50-75 ® Pro:25-50 1.0 .620 -1.8 .863
Pro:75-100 ® Pro:50-75 1.4 .517 -3.4 .742Table 4
Manufacturing Employment Shares and Growth Rates






















75-100 25.4 24.4 75.9 58.3
Anti- 50-75 23.0 26.7 97.7 67.5
Business 25-50 28.5 21.1 101.8 76.5
0-25 26.6 17.7 99.1 54.7
0-25 32.3 23.2 104.5 104.0
Pro- 25-50 30.4 20.3 85.8 91.0
Business 50-75 28.3 19.7 88.8 91.7
75-100 28.5 17.1 97.7 89.1 Table 5
Manufacturing Employment Shares and Growth Rates
By Individual Borders
Border States 1992 Share Growth Rate
1947-1992
Pro-business  side Anti-business side Pro Anti Pro Anti
Texas Oklahoma 17.3 16.1 29 54
Arkansas Oklahoma 43.5 27.6 132 144
Arkansas Missouri 40.7 30.1 158 125
Tennessee Missouri 47.8 39.3 100 78
Tennessee Kentucky 48.4 38.7 142 122
Virginia Kentucky 17.7 3.4 143 -55
Virginia West Virginia 31.7 20.1 59 5
Virginia Maryland 16.3 8.5 89 84
North Dakota Minnesota 16.2 6.3 137 20
South Dakota Minnesota 16.2 11.1 138 27
Iowa Minnesota 28.5 25.1 130 85
Iowa Wisconsin 29.9 30.2 109 103
Iowa Illinois 33.6 23.1 73 13
Iowa Missouri 25.2 16.7 121 122
Nebraska Missouri 13.8 10.0 69 167
Kansas Missouri 21.1 22.6 78 96

































b 1 - - -.01
(.02)
-




2 .306 .310 .330 .350



























b 1 - - .08
(.10)
-




2 .118 .118 .120 .161
N 892 892 892 892Table 7
Statistical Model
Estimates Shift-parameter q for Simulated Borders

































Estimates of Shift-parameter q for Alternative Specifications and Years
Coal Region Excluded
Estimate of q N













































Right-to-Work Law   (21)
No Right-to-Work Law   (29)
Geography of Right-to-Work LawsFigure 2a








Case of t = ¥






Case of t = 0





Trend in Manufacturing Endowment and t = 0
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